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Single Idea 8528
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
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Full Idea
To explain how tropes form bundles, concurrence relations are invoked. But tropes F and G and a concurrence relation C don't ensure that F stands in C to G. So trope theory needs 'instantiation' relations (special relational tropes) after all.
Gist of Idea
If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all
Source
Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §7)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.157
A Reaction
Campbell presents relations as 'second-order' items dependent on tropes (Idea 8525), but that seems unclear. Daly's argument resembles Russell's (which he likes), that some sort of universal is inescapable. It also resembles Bradley's regress (7966).
Related Ideas
Idea 8525
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
Idea 7966
Relations must be linked to their qualities, but that implies an infinite regress of relations [Bradley]
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[arguments against the existence of tropes]:
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14327
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Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other
[Russell, by Mumford]
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15480
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Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things)
[Martin,CB]
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8538
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Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
[Armstrong]
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4445
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If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
[Armstrong]
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15748
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Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes
[Lewis]
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15749
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Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates
[Lewis]
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15750
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Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity
[Lewis]
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8527
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More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location
[Daly]
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8528
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If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all
[Daly]
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10742
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Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts
[Oliver]
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4611
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The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
[Heil]
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4483
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If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical
[Loux]
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18352
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Tropes have existence independently of any entities
[Lowe]
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8286
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Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects
[Lowe]
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8294
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How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes?
[Lowe]
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8295
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Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle?
[Lowe]
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8296
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Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide?
[Lowe]
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12253
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If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract?
[Oderberg]
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4462
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A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex
[Moreland]
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4463
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In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes
[Moreland]
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7959
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How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way?
[Macdonald,C]
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7960
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Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor
[Macdonald,C]
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